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 1905.] MAN. (No. 82.
 Before offering a few criticisms, I may, perhaps, allude to a point which I neglected
 in my former note. If magic is the attempt to produce results by the simple operation
 of causation, irrevocably fixed and acting according to law, but not such causation as is
 actually existent, what view are we to take of the magical acts which do produce a
 result, though not in the way intended? For example, the doctor professes to extract
 one or more cockroaches from hiis patient's head, and the sufferer's headache is relieved
 by the effect of their suggestion ; or, to take an instance, the validity of which some
 will not admit, the diviner series in his crystal, and the vision which he sees, though not
 due to spirits, or to ainything to which I am prepared to term magic, is veridical. Can
 we term these operations magical because the operator regards them as such ? Or must
 we not rather have regard to some more objective criterion ?
 MM. Huibert and Mauss (p. 13) argue that magical acts are not those which are
 recognised as such by the operator and spectator only, for this would be to erect a
 suibjective criterion, but tllose which a whole society terms magical. I cannot see that
 their definition is less subjective than the one they reject. In Australia and America,
 for example, before the advent of the whites-and in Europe itself, for that matter-until
 modern times Ilypnotism and the phenomena we now term sensory and motor automatism
 were regarded as magical. Do they cease to be inagical when one sceptic suggests that
 they are not so ? It is clear that the scepticism may be of two sorts * (1) negative,
 which denies the existence of any result, and which, so far as it is correct, justifies us
 in designating the acts in question by the name of magic; and (2), positive, wlich
 admits the result, buit denies that it was reached in the way intended. Does either
 kind of scepticism justify us in denying the magical character of an act, and if so,
 which ?
 Two questions are therefore raised by the definition of MM. Hubert and Mauss
 (1) What is meant by a Society ? Does the existence of one enlightened Fuegian
 change the character of the acts of his fellows Are we justified in separating, one
 race from another, or do we ineani by society the m hole of mankind ? (2) Again, when a
 savage terms an act magical, he meanis something very different from what MM. Hubert
 and Mauss mean. If all mankind ag,ree in calling, an act magical, but mean tlhereby
 totally different things, according to whether they regard the act as effective or
 ineffective, are we justified in regarding that act as magical ?
 The objective criterion of effectiveness seems less open to objection, but, as I have
 shown above, we find ourselves confronted with a problem if we adopt it. The dilemma
 is more apparent than real. It by no means follows that a man of science is a magician
 if he attributes to one cause, even a non-existent one, what is really due to another.
 Belief in the materiality of heat did not make Priestley a magician. Nor did the fact
 that the vanes of a radiometer do not turn for the reason assigned by the discoverer
 put Sir William Crookes on a level with a medicine man, even though his views on
 certain subjects may make him, in the eyes of some of his fellows, little, if any, superior
 to a savage shaman. If, tllerefore, we say that qua' effective a savage rite ceases to be
 magic and becomes science, the position of rites of leeclheraft and divination becomes
 clear.
 Another criterion suggested by MM. Hubert aind Mauss is that of publicity (p. 19).
 For them the magical rite flees the light of day. What then of the rainmakers ? Are
 not their rites magical ? The Intichimna ceremonies are for ouar authors religious, and it
 would take me too far to (liscuss them ; but I can cite the European spring and summer
 ceremonies without much fear of meeting with a similar answer. Are the rites of
 vegetation, the bonfires, the rain charms, the expulsion of evil, and so on, not magical,
 and if so, are they niot public, nay acts of the society ?
 I may note that our authors are disinclined to class as magical any element in a
 religious rite. Thus they refuse to see anything but a religious ceremony in the rain
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 charm performed at the feast of Succoth by the high priest. Would they also class the
 douching of a saint's image as religion ? If so, I cannot guess what definition of
 religion they are prepared to adopt.
 Another point oQn which some difference of opinion is permissible is the character of
 the wizard's familiar. For MM. Hubert and Mauss it is always the species and not the
 individual animal whiclh is associated with the magician (p. 32). It is true they admi't-i some
 exceptions, but these exceptions are far more numerous than they suspect. In North
 America the manitou, or medicine-animal, is undoubtedly the individuLal (Journ. Anthr.
 Inst., XXI., 31). The medicine may be lost, and once lost is irrecoverable. Among
 the Eskimo the toranaq is an individual bear (Rep. Bur. Ethn., 1884-5, p. 591). The
 pawang of the Malays is held to be associated by the soul of an individual tiger
 (Newbold, II., 387), unless appearances are very deceptive. Torrend (South African
 Bantu Languages, p. 292) tells us that magicians keep a snake in their pouclhes, and
 here again it seems to be the individual animal. So, too, in Siberia (Journ. Anthr.
 Inst., XXI., 133), in Celebes (rijdskr., XLI., 548), and elsewbere. MM. Hubert and
 Mauss can, perhaps, cite cases in which the magician spares the species. But against
 this I urge that tbis proof is hardly conclusive; they may spare the species and yet
 r egard the individual animal as their " nearest friend." The clearest proof of this lies
 in the fact that his life is regarded as bound up witlh that of the individual animal. In
 a remarkable account of the performance of the blood bond between a human being and
 an animal, Pere Buleon says (Sous le Ciel d'Afrique, p. 90 sq.) "Avez-vous tue
 " une panthere, vois ne tarderez pas 'a apprendre la mort de quelque f6ticheur," and
 congruent observations are found in other authors. I see little or no evidence that the
 shaman is associated with the species rather than the individual and much that ilndicates
 the reverse.
 I am far from having exhausted all points of controversy, still less all points of
 interest in the valuable memoir on whichl I have commented; only conisideratio-ns
 of space forbid me to pursue a fascinating subject still further. N. W. THOMAS.
 India: Fire Walking. Hearn.
 Passing through the Fire at Phalen. By Captain G. R. Hearn, R.E.
 Conmmunicated by H. if. Risley, C.S.1., C.I.E.
 Phalen is a Jat village some three miles east of Kosi, in the Mathura District of
 the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. For many years it has been the custom in
 this village (and, so far as I am aware, it is unique in this respect) that a Brahman,
 called the "' Panda," shall pass through the fire on the day or night of the ftull moon
 of Phalgun, which ushers in the Holi festival. This ceremony has been described by
 Growse in " The Mathura District Memoir," but a fuller account may be of interest.
 Like nearly all the villages in these parts, Phalen possesses a tank, from whiclh
 mud has been excavated to make the houses of the village. After the lapse of centuries,
 new houses being built on the ruins of earlier ones, which have dissolved into eartlh
 again, the village of to-day is elevated on a mound. But the village "square," which
 adjoins the tank, is at the pristine groubd level, and this may show the great age of the
 ceremony to be described.
 Rather to one side of the square, and on the side furthest from the tank, is a small
 whitewashed mud "shrine." Into this, somne eight days before the Holi festival, the
 Panda enters and spends his time in prayer and fasting, his only food being milk. A
 bonfire is made half-way between the "shrine " and the tank with a substratum of
 cowdung cakes and a superstructure of dry thorn bushes of the " Rarll," or wild caper.
 This would measure when completed roughly 10 ft. by 8 ft. by 10 ft. high, the cowdung
 substratum beinig about 3 ft. high. I observed women winding skeins of cotton tlhread
 round this bonfire before the lighting, anid worshipping it. This was during the after-
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